localities. 695

In recent times it has come into custom and is considered "according to customary law" at the meetings to declare a judgment by default (sirt khukm, sirt kesik) after the defendant has failed to appear twice. This was not in the old customary law. There are always complaints concerning judgments by default, with the declaration that "the biis did not act according to customary law."

In their decrees the biis must state clearly what /184/ the petitioner sought and what was adjudged in his favor, or how the case ended, and especially to record the biilyk established for the judgment.

A copy of the judgment, cut out from the book (1) must be

1. There is a model of the form of the bii's book in Supplement No. 6.

given to the person in whose favor the case was ended, in final form, as a result of swearing or not swearing the oath, if an oath was assigned.

A copy is given to the unsatisfied side, if it declares dissatisfaction with the judgment from one bii of over 100 rubles, or after a theft, at the volost session, for a suit for over 100 rubles, or for baranta or for murder.

When he receives the copy the receiver must write a receipt in the book on the reverse side of the report.

In the copies they report briefly and clearly: the content of the suit without explaining the testimony of the opposing sides; the judgment with an exact indication of the sum exacted and the biilyk; the time when the judgment must be carried out; the year, month and day of the judgment; the number and the book from which it is cut out, the affixing of the seal.

According to Amanbai, the weak are subjected to injustices and force at the volost sessions, which assemble in the steppe. 695 661

In the opinion of sultan Babagaliev, (2) only Kazakhs of their

2. Lieutenant of the army infantry, Kazakh of the Perovsk uyezd.

own volost and persons of means receive satisfaction at a volost session. Indeed the biis of the extraordinary session hesitate still less than the biis of the lower instances, knowing that the judgment of the extraordinary session is final. On the eve of the court session they

695
661

simply bargain with the litigants on the amount of the bribes. (3)

3. Sultan Babagaliev advises, among other things, the following measure: to call together half of all the biis in the uyezd to the uyezd government and all the volost administrators; from their number the uyezd chiefs would designate one volost official as chairman every day, and one bii apiece from each volost as members of the court, and would seat them in special quarters where outside persons should not be admitted, so that biis not invited to judge (dzhanbas bii) would not interfere with the case, as often happens. The strength of the measure proposed lies in the fact that neither the biis nor the litigants should know /185/ which biis would examine which case. They should discover this immediately before the beginning of the examination. At these sessions it is necessary that the uyezd chief or his assistant should make certain that the biis do not postpone a case to the next day, which is the equivalent of receiving bribes.

/185/ The extortion of bribes (para) by the biis may take place before outside persons or in private. In the latter case the bii hints in the following manner: "This case depends entirely on me. Other biis would take so and so much money, but I take nothing." Then with the mediation of his man the bii can make himself understood more openly to the defendant: "You are right. They will discover the justice of your case and impose an oath on those who exonerate you." (ak sen aklykka shygarady, dzhandy uzing shygatugun dzheringe salady). He says to the plaintiff: "We will require an oath from the side which does not acquit him. We will determine a larger fine for you. We will also sentence him to pay the court costs and produce the penalty for you without delay. You are losing nothing, but give us what you can"(dzhandy chykpaytugun dzherge salamyz, aybyngdy kubeytamiz, yana chygyndy onyng muynyna salamyz, yana toktausiz mal [illegible] underib beremiz, sen kuymeysen, bizge beretuguningdi ber) (Torgai). Later the judgment is decreed on behalf of the side which gave the most. (1)

1. This is included as an example. It is obvious that extortion by the biis is not a kind of common occurrence which invariably accompanies bii justice.

695
666

The volost administrators also influence the judgment. If a a volost official is protecting the defendant, the bii imposes an oath on the group of fifty of the defendant, when it was necessary to impose it on a village. He does this so that there will be a greater probability of the appearance of the juror (shygatugun dzher), for in a close circle there are fewer enemies, and even these are challenged as "disputables." The bii declares: "Say first of all who your enemies are or the disputable ones." The defendant names two or three persons.

If the plaintiff enjoys the favor of a volost official, the defendant is brought forward at once, and the bii imposes an oath the village of the defendant instead of the group of fifty. Later, when the disputable persons are challenged, the defendant is required to prove that the persons challenged actually had been involved in litigation with him at some time.

/186/ If the bii is not decided on doing what is pleasing to the volost official, the latter encourages him with the words: "Do not be afraid of an appeal. The exaction will be taken care of before then, and after that we will see somehow" (sizning khukmingiz buzulgancha dzhuaberdgan mal tulenib kalady).

When a bii learns that the volost official received a bribe from the defendant while he himself only received a bribe from the plaintiff, he sends to the defendant to receive a bribe before deciding the case in his favor. If by now the defendant will no longer give the bii anything, the bii judges the case in favor of the plaintiff, figuring in this way: "I have rendered a service to the plaintiff, my affair is closed. Let the volost official change my decision." But if a copy of the sentence has already been given out, a reversal of the decision of the bii can follow only by means of a volost session, and the volost official is left to paralyze the judgment by not carrying out the exaction or evaluating the object of the exaction at higher than its real value (Torgai).

For an unjust decision of one bii, overruled by many biis, the first is not prosecuted. (1) But if it is proven, with the help of

687

1. In Kazalinsk in 1887 there was a case in which a judge was badly beaten by a defendant for an unjust decision. The complaint by the bii against the offender, as an act during the fulfillment of the duties of office, was transferred to a court of arbitration, which sentenced the offender to three

687 days confinement by the police.

witnesses, (2) that the bii has accepted a bribe, in most cases this

2. There are cases where both sides present many (70-90) witnesses, ready to testify under oath that the bii has taken or has not taken a bribe.

circumstance is passed over to a court magistrate for the further prosecution of the case of criminal breach of trust.

In the steppe in such cases they complain to the volost official, who charges the bii to "soothe the heart" of the complainer (keunin tultirib bering), i. e., either to clear himself by oath, or to give some sort of satisfaction to the dissatisfied person.

If there are no witnesses the bii usually clears himself by oath.

694 /187/ The summons of the litigants and the other interrogated persons to appear in court is in general the duty of the volost official. He has riders /dzhigity/ for the summoning of the litigants. The plaintiff gives the rider who is sent for the defendant a certain sum, called "kyzmet" (good turn) which depends on the distance of the village of the defendant. If he wins the suit, he receives this money included with the other court expenses from the defendant.

The defendant asks the rider to tell the volost official that he was not at home. The rider refuses, demanding that the person under summons depart at once. Then the rider receives a bribe and reports to the volost official that the defendant was not at home. The volost official releases the plaintiff who is waiting there, for several days, adding after him: "Do not come empty, a!" (kuru kel'mengiz a!); meanwhile before the others the volost official says nothing, only rubbing his beard as though oiling it - a sign which is understandable enough to the plaintiff. After the departure of the plaintiff, the volost official asks the rider in a low voice whether he had found the defendant at home. The rider says: "He was. He gave me so and so much and promised also not to offend the volost official (kuru koymaymen)." In the evening of the same day the volost official sends another rider who frightens the defendant for not appearing. The defendant gives him something, in order to weary the plaintiff by delays.

Sometimes the volost official gives the plaintiff to understand, via an outside person, that the defendant was not at home 3 or 4 times, but nevertheless he, the volost official, will force the

694
661

defendant to be found, even if he has concealed himself under the ground (yerge kerib kitse de taptyramyn). But he needs remuneration for this. The plaintiff gives him something. Then the volost sends someone to tell the defendant on the sly that he should come but not to be afraid. After this the case is transferred to the bii.

694

After the litigants have presented a documnet with the choice of several biis, the volost official designates the place and time for their court appearance, warning the plaintiff that if he does not appear his suit will be refused, and the defendant that he will be considered convicted for non-appearance. But in spite of this, when the defendant does not appear, the case is not decided in his absence, but they send once again to his place of abode, and only if he /188/ flees from there can the volost official command that the judgment be made in his absence. Sometimes the defendant submits a complaint after all this for the biis' judgment by default. Then the biis are required to swear that he was summoned twice (Torgai).

694
683

In the opinion of Torgai, article 35 in Samokvasov: "If someone is sent after a person, and the envoy is beaten and receives wounds on the face, then the latter must make the same marks on the former in return" etc., is probably founded on the orders of some individual powerful volost official. Although on the other hand the Kazakhs have a proverb: A stick is rewarded by a stick (tayakka tayak kaytady), i.e., an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.

If a rider was sent by a volost official but not on the basis of an order from the uyezd chief, then there is no prosecution for signs (tamga) on his face from blows. At any rate, when there are no witnesses, and the "tamga" /brand/ is only on the rider and not on the owner of the tent, then it depends on the state in which the rider emerged. /v tom, budto prikhodil dzhigit/. The affair ends with the words: "Come out and make peace" (dalaga chygyngiz yarasyngiz), for no oath is imposed for this. (1)

1. It may happen that the rider collects people for some sort of general suit and encounters resistance in this and receives blows with signs on his face, his body. Then the people, who want to get around the rider, give him something, but not by customary law but voluntarily, for example a horse and a coat. They ask him not to lodge a complaint, saying: "Even if your head is cut, it is under your cap, even though your arm is broken it is in a sleeve" (bas yarylsa burk ichinde, kol synsa

[167 cont.]

provinces, which had suffered from the ravages of the Kazaks for so long. Finally it prognosticated the most brilliant political hopes for the government. It was hoped that these hordes which had voluntarily submitted themselves would be willing to engage in weakening the Dzungars, whose ruler, Galdan Tsyren, a man who had inspired fear in Peter the Great himself, still lived.

[661] It was also hoped that the Kazaks could be used to bring to reason the enemies which Russia had within her, such as the Bashkirs, whose frequent revolts were alarming the government. It was also impossible to ignore Abulkhair's proposal to subject his neighbors, the Aral people and the Karakalpaks, to the Russian scepter, and particularly the people of Khiva, whose hands were still red with the blood of Prince Bekovich-Cherkaskii, shamefully assassinated during the reign of Peter the Great with all his unfortunate companions. Once she had punished this perfidious people, Russia could found a profitable trade with Central Asia on a solid basis, and even (as was generally hoped) with India.

The vast genius of Peter the Great had already seized upon most of these prospects, but he had neither the time nor sufficient means to accomplish his projects. He would have found them if death had not struck him at the moment when he had just terminated the war with Sweden and had begun to fix his attention upon the Asian border (1).

1. Rychkov, in Chapter I of his History of Orenburg, says: "This is why [168] His Majesty (Peter I), as is known, I believe, by many highly distinguished persons, had reflected several times about ways of insuring himself against the attacks of this changeable people (the Kazaks." Farther on he says: "Thus, after having ended the war with Sweden victoriously, he sought means of securing against the Kazaks the very places where, with God's help, the Orenburg line is now being raised, and of

[201 cont.]

x 648 622 [152] Meanwhile Abulkhair concealed his resentment and never ceased to give assurances to everyone of his devotion to Russia, asserting that all these attacks had been made by Kazaks who were disobeying him. He even went so far as to advise that they be penalized and punished by death (2).

2. See the letter of July, 1743 from Khan Abulkhair to Nepluev.

But when the troops were reinforced along the Russian border, and the Bashkirs profited by the absence of the Kazaks [727] to attack their auls and began to carry off their studs, Abulkhair thought seriously of halting the raids. But this was no longer in his power to do. His people, greedy for plunder, wished to be at peace only when they were alarmed by the advance of Russian troops across the Ural to go into the steppes to punish the [641] brigands. This was only a rumor, spread on purpose, no doubt, by the prudent head of the Orenburg region. Yet this was not where the true intentions of the Russian government lay. It did not wish to lose the regular army in pursuing nomad brigands in the desert wastes, but found it more advantageous to punish them through another people, as restless and as unfaithful as the Kazaks themselves. In a word, the government wished to arm the Kalmuks against them. In the meantime, Nepluev was ordered (3) to [202] try to seize Kazaks of the leading families

3. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of October 31, 1743.

as hostages. Either as a consequence of this order or for some other reason, Abulkhair suddenly delivered a considerable number of Russian subjects who had been taken prisoner by his horde during the most recent raids, and promised to return the others soon.

[728] The year 1744 not only failed to bring peace along the Russian border, but even increased the dangers of those who lived there, for Khan Abulkhair removed his mask and took an open part in the hostilities of his people. His more daring subjects continued

[205 cont.]
x648 [721] made no raids during the year 1745. Rychkov says (1), according

1. The continuation of his history of Orenburg.

to a Russian Cossack who was with the Little Horde then, that this year as in 1773, Khan Abulkhair incited his subjects to renew their raids on the right bank of the Ural, but on this occasion the people refused to obey. However we cannot accept this report as accurate for the following reasons:

1. The Kazaks were too accustomed to pillage to refuse the proposal of their khan to attack a foreign country, especially when they had not had a chance to test the force of its arms.

2. At that time Abulkhair's attention was directed to Khiva, whose inhabitants, attacked by those of Turkestan, had sent to him to ask help, and who although subjects of Persia wanted to have Sultan Nurali as khan later. He sent Nepluev the letters he had received from Khiva on this subject and asked his advice.

[727] 3. It was at this time that he swore an oath of loyalty in his aoul in the presence of a Russian officer, to Emperor Peter III, successor to Elizabeth, and afterwards liberated 30 prisoners, Russians as well as Kalmuks, who had been taken by his subjects.

● [661] 4. He complained about Nepluev to the highest authorities (2),

2. See Abulkhair's letter and Nepluev's rescript of September 17, 1745 in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

and indicated that except for his personal quarrel with this governor and the displeasure he had felt at the refusal to exchange [206] his son Khodja Akhmet for Chingis, he had no other cause for complaint against Russia nor any harmful intention.

As for the office of khan which had been proposed to the son in Khiva, Nepluev had sought by all possible means to persuade

[212 cont.]

[648] [643] This measure was fully successful. Nurali was proclaimed khan in an assembly of the people, and they sent to the court Sultan Djanibek and several distinguished Kazaks, who came to bring this news to Orenburg. They said they had been sent on behalf of the Middle and the Little Hordes, and requested therefore that Khan Nurali be named khan of the two hordes. Several reasons made it impossible to satisfy this request. 1) The Russian officer who presided at the election of Nurali stated that Djanibek Batyr was the only elder of the Middle Horde who had taken part, and that he had always lived near Abulkhair, as had several tens of ordinary Kazaks who had long been separated from the Middle [641] Horde and who also lived among the subjects of Abulkhair. 2) Al- [648] most all the most distinguished sultans of the Middle Horde had either their sons or their closest kinsmen as hostages with the Dzungarian prince, who from that moment had begun to raise claims to sovereignty over the entire horde, and this caused the Russian government grave suspicions as to the obedience of that horde.

On the other hand they did not wish to vex Nurali by presenting a formal refusal to the request of his ambassador, and it [643] was decided to name him khan of the Kazaks without designating any horde. On the day of February 26, 1749, he was sent the imperial letter patent concerning his new office. At the same time another letter patent was sent in the name of the Kazak people to confirm their choice, and Nepluev was enjoined to invite Nurali to come to Orenburg and to proclaim him khan there in an imposing manner.

[662] Before speaking of this ceremony, we will say that [213] Nepluev and Tevkelev were aided in their design to cause Nurali's election by his mother, Khaness Papai, who by her intelligence had won the respect of the entire Little Horde and sometimes had much influence upon its administration. Because she liked the Russians, she had often dissuaded her husband Abulkhair from carrying out plans which were harmful to Russia (1). All this

[562]

1. She possessed a stamp with her name,

X 648 [214] [214 cont.]

preserved until today in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

X 648 765 result [215] of the vanity which is very common among the Kazaks. But since there was nothing harmful in it, Nepluev reported it to the higher authorities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs not only consented to satisfy the wish of Abulkhair's family, but even found that its execution would be useful, if Nurali consented to choose the site of the burial monument in the vicinity of the Russian border and to bring the body of his father there. Then a rule could be established of burying all the khans of the Little Horde there, and a city could be erected near the cemetery which Abulkhair himself had asked to be built. It was resolved, in accordance with these considerations, to yield to Nurali's wish, and a civilian official and an engineer sent from Orenburg announced to him the conditions under which this work had to be carried out. The official was told to invite Nurali to locate the site of the sepulcher three or four days' journey from the Russian border, above all on the Ilek River, and to associate a town with it. The engineer was ordered to examine the site, draw a map of it, and to make the façade of the monument.

This object gave rise to correspondence and conferences which went on for several years. Regulating itself according to circumstances and the conduct of the Khan, the Russian government showed itself sometimes ready and sometimes averse to carrying out his desire. Finally the project was relegated to oblivion, as we shall see below. The reasons for it were strong enough on both sides.

[152 661] Nurali was afraid of establishing himself near the Russian military lines, and his subjects were against it. Thus the first response they gave as the choice of a site was too indecisive. Subsequently it was proposed to lay the foundation of the cemetery and build the town at the mouth of the Emba instead of on the Ilek River, but since this river too was near the border, and the Kazaks also feared to settle there (1), [216] the khan for the second

1. Second Lieutenant Rigelman, who went

[218 cont.]
249 The news of her death arrived in Orenburg before Tevkelev had been able to have a conference with Nurali (2), and prevented

[139]

2. While waiting for Tevkelev, Nepleuv had delegated an officer interpreter to Nurali and his mother to advise them and to acquire information about the Dzungarian ambassadors. This interpreter was ordered to present to the Khan, as a rare thing, 10 chetverts of flour and as much [219] groats. The principal aim of this gift was to induce the Kazaks to take wheat from the Russians in exchange for their merchandise.

the latter from being told of the orders given to begin [219] his father's tomb immediately and the intention to receive Chingis as hostage. These measures had become unnecessary in a time of calm.

[161] Being in ignorance of the indulgent disposition of the government and in order to conform to previous demands, Nurali in 1749 presented his legitimate brother Adil as hostage to replace Sultan Aichuvak, and in 1750 he exchanged this brother for his own son Pirali, who was only five years old.

[162] At this time Sultan Batyr, the father of Kaip, then khan of Khiva, and the son of the Kaip who had been the sultan of the Kazaks, opened relations with the authorities in Orenburg. As was already said above, his father Kaip had written in 1718 to Peter the Great. Batyr had inherited his father's hatred for Abulkhair and had never recognized his authority, and for this reason had had no relations with Russia for a long time. But when a part of the Little Horde proclaimed him khan, the equal of Nurali, and when his son had become the sovereign of Khiva, he had still less respect for Abulkhair's son and hoped that Russia would have the same consideration for him as for his rival.

However, at the beginning of his relations with Orenburg, he had not decided to request that he be recognized as khan. In

[224 cont.]

×648 With this in mind he was granted several favors, including
●[661] the fact that his youngest son, aged three, was accepted as hostage in place of his eldest, Sultan Pirali.

[361] To this same end there was a return to the thought expressed by Empress Anna in her ukase to Kirilov, dated February 11, 1736, an idea which was in accord with what we mentioned earlier concerning Abulkhair's wish, to build a city at the mouth of the Syr Darya and to begin its population with criminals condemned to exile. But all these projects were unsuccessful.

×648 578 The hatred of the Khans Abulkhair and Kaip, which had been known since the beginning of the 17th century, was not extinguished by their death, but was left as a heritage to their children and their children's children. We shall see in the course of this work that it has not only not been entirely eliminated today, but even has not weakened among the principal descendants of these two chiefs. But before speaking of these contemporaries, we shall describe the history of their ancestors. The constancy with which these two families have hated each other and pursued each other for a hundred years merits special attention. This hatred may go back even farther, perhaps, for we do not know what sentiments existed between Abulkhair's father and Kaip's father.

×648 We have already said that Sultan Batyr, son of Kaip, and his son, the khan of Khiva, had sent ambassadors to Orenburg for the first time in 1650/1750/. Although their proposals were not accepted, being prejudicial to Khan Nurali, who was recognized by Russia, nevertheless the arrival of Batyr's envoys and their intentions of allying themselves with the Russians gave birth to suspicions in Nurali's heart and reignited his hereditary hatred for Batyr. Furthermore he could not view with composure the fact that in spite of the refusal of the [225] Russian government to send all the caravans in general across Batyr's pasture lands, his son, the khan of Khiva, had forbidden his subjects to go from Khiva to Orenburg and to return by a route other than that of the lands of his father. This measure diminished Nurali's influence over trade and the revenues which he took in, like all the Kazak khans, based on the notion of a right over merchandise passing through their steppes.

43 61 51

●[66

[225 cont.]

x648 In 1753 the angry Nurali directed that the first caravan [579 439] from Khiva which went to Russia or returned from there was to be pillaged. His orders were carried out. At once Kazaks of the Alimul descent line of the Karakitin tribe pillaged many Khivan and Turkomen merchants on the Sagiz, who were coming with goods under the escort of Kazaks of the same Alimul descent line but of the Chiklin tribe. Nepluev sent a civil official to the horde expressly to persuade the Khan to call the bandits to account, [662 681] deprive them of the goods, and return them to their owners. Nurali replied decisively that the pillage had taken place by his order because Sultan Batyr, not content with disobeying him, was also seeking to arouse the Middle Horde against him, and that Batyr in agreement with his son was requiring the Khiva caravans to travel only by way of his own auls. Moreover, in order to justify himself and with the aim of arousing Russia against Khiva, he wrote to Orenburg that Kaip and Barak (or Batyr) were preparing to attack the Russian border, and in that case he advised that the land of Khiva be conquered and promised to take it in a few days if he were sent the assistance of 10,000 Russian troops with artillery.

[579 577] His goal in proposing his services was easy to guess, and thus Nepluev and Tevkelev did not listen to his insinuations but repeated the demand for the return of the stolen merchandise of the robbed caravan and reproached him for conduct unbecoming to a khan. Their entreaties would have been useless if the interpreter charged with delivering them had not caused Nurali to hope, on instruction from Nepluev, that if he gave satisfaction to the [226] merchants he would gain the right to request the stipend from the government which had been assigned to him but had not been given all this time. This produced a greater effect than all the advice, and he busied himself at once with making his subjects give up the goods.

his subjects give up the goods.

Kaip, the khan of Khiva, acted quite differently. While the Russian government was causing the restitution to his subjects of what they had lost, this khan had a Russian caravan halted in Khiva, and in spite of the demands of the Orenburg authorities,

[721 439]

[226 cont.]
he did not release it until nearly a year had passed. When this caravan returned to Orenburg in 1754, an envoy of Kaip himself accompanied it as well as a Russian officer who had been in Khiva. The latter declared that he had met Sultan Erali on his way and that this prince had begged him to report to Nepluev that he and his brothers were ready to attack Khiva to avenge the insults of Sultan Batyr and his son, and that he planned to join the discontented subjects of Kaip, to put him to death, to seize his place, and to release the Russian prisoners who were then in Khiva. He asked only that in case he were unsuccessful Russia would promise to ransom him if he himself were taken.

To everyone's great astonishment the envoy from Khiva, instead of carrying out his master's orders, complained to the Russian government of the avidity and injustices of the Khan. He described the evils he made the people suffer, and in the name of all the Uzbeks, the people [race] to whom he belonged, he demanded help in order to dethrone the Khan.

Although this demand provided Russia with an opportunity to punish the Khivans for their perfidy and their prince for his insolence the year before in detaining a caravan from Orenburg, nevertheless the government then thought the conquest of Khiva more difficult than it was useful. Moreover Erali's pledge provided hope for acquiring some influence over this land without bloodshed. Consequently the government refused to acquiesce to the proposal of the Khivan envoy, who [227] had solicited help in overthrowing Kaip, but did not forbid him to ask help from the Kazak princes (1). Khan Nurali and Sultan Erali were

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of April 2, 1755.

permitted to march against Khiva and to seize it if luck was on their side. Also it was decided to grant Erali his ransom if he happened to be captured on this expedition.

Russia would certainly have gained an enormous advantage commercially if Abulkhair's sons had carried out their plan and

[227 cont.]
had been successful in seizing Khiva. But unfortunately they did not even start toward the realization of the end proposed by Erali. The reason for this inaction was no doubt the insufficiency of the troops they could have opposed to the forces of Kaip and his father together.

Prince Maksiutov, the captain sent at that time from Orenburg to the Little Horde, wrote in his reports that Nurali Khan and his brothers were preparing to march against Khiva and convoked an assembly of the people who approved of the plan. But when a khoja, who as a kind of saint had been asked for a blessing for the success of the expedition, forbade them to make war against the Khivans, they obeyed him. The Middle Horde then suffered from the last exertions of the Dzungars. In 1754 they found themselves so harassed by the latter that a large number of Kazaks of this horde asked the government to allow them to pass their women and children over the Russian lines if they could not be allowed this permission themselves. Some of them went so far as to ask that they be granted lands on the border, where they promised to engage in agriculture and to build villages.

Such a guard would have been too unsafe, and it would even have been dangerous to allow the wives and children of the Kazaks to enter the forts. Thus the governor of Siberia was directed to pay no attention to [228] such demands (1). Shortly

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 317, 1755.

after this, part of the Middle Horde once more asked to be received under the protection of the forts. This time, because of the remonstrances of Nepluev and also because it wished to treat the Kazaks favorably, the government allowed them to live as nomads near the Uisk line and directed that in case they were attacked they were to be allowed to cross within the Russian border, but with hostages taken from them to guarantee their peacefulness.

This favor, which was granted them at the end of 1756,

[231 cont.]

x 648 Fortunately this region was then governed by Nepluev. His [643 722] presence of mind and his actions averted the storm which menaced it. He immediately united the troops under his command at the points where defense was most necessary. He had reinforcements brought in from Kazan and also drew them from the Don Cossacks and from the khan of the Volga Kalmuks. While waiting, he armed the Meshcheriaks and Teptiars against the Bashkirs. He promised a complete pardon to those rebels who showed signs of repentance, and offered large pecuniary rewards for the heads of Batyr Shah and his principal accomplices. He sent declarations in the Tatar language to the Kazak hordes in the name of the akhun of Orenburg, in which this senior member of the Moslem clergy expressed his approbation of the Bashkir revolt but at the same time his fear that if they came to make themselves independent of Russia they might attack the Kazaks and finish by conquering them.

[724] When the auxiliary troops had entered the land of the Bashkirs, the latter were not powerful enough to resist the Russians, Kalmuks, Teptiars, and Meshcheriaks together, and they fled across the Ural River with their wives and children, numbering more than 50,000 persons. A large number perished crossing the [727 662] river, and the others concealed themselves within the hordes. Those who remained in their settlements asked pardon, but their repentance was not sincere, and they were waiting for a new revolt. To avert this, and above all to prevent the Bashkirs from joining the Kazaks, Nepluev was obliged to take a cruel measure, but one which the times and circumstances made absolutely necessary.

x 648 He felt that it was necessary, for the security of the [232] 662 Orenburg line, to cause an irreconcilable hatred between the 661 Bashkirs and the Kazaks, for without this a reunion between them was always possible, and the inevitable result of such an alliance would be the ruin of all the Russian establishments on the Ural River. To achieve this end, he decided to place in the power of the Kazaks the wives and children of the Bashkirs who had left Russia to seek refuge among the Kazaks. Elizabeth's ministry had wished to protect the Russian border by a method more consistent with the views of kindness and humanity, but it was necessary to yield to

[232 cont.]

circumstances, and Nepluev, who had finally received the orders he had requested for the execution of his plan, at once informed the Khan, the Kazak sultans, and the most distinguished elders that as a reward for their faithfulness and devotion to Russia, the Empress was presenting them, as a gift, all the wives and daughters of the Bashkirs who were among them, on condition that the men be surrendered on the line, or at least driven out of the Kazak hordes. In addition, other rewards were promised for the extradition of the deserters.

The voluptuous Kazaks hastened to seize the women who were being abandoned to them. The Bashkirs wished to defend their families, but their number was too small and they could not resist. Some of them perished on the spot, others were surrendered to the Russians, and still others returned by themselves to their homes, waiting impatiently for the time to carry out their firm resolve to avenge this offense perpetrated by the Kazaks.

Rage and jealousy immediately aroused bands of avengers among the Bashkirs, who requested permission from the government to cross the Ural. Nepluev replied that the Empress did not grant permission to cross the border, but in secret he gave orders to the commanders of the forts and military posts to pay no attention to the people who crossed without permission into the steppes beyond the [233] Ural. Taking advantage of the pretended negligence of the guards, whole bands of Bashkirs crossed the Ural, fell upon the hordes, and began to pillage and massacre and to take away women and children.

Khan Nurali complained; he received the reply from Orenburg that the Kazaks had brought all these misfortunes upon their own heads by receiving the faithless deserters in their villages, and that all the Bashkirs were going to hasten to make similar exploits. Then Nurali's subjects took arms and began to repulse the attacks of their enemies, which the latter repeated constantly. The two people continued to destroy each other in this manner until Nepluev decided that it was fitting to call a halt to these disturbances. It was then strictly forbidden to the Bashkirs to cross the Ural, and it was suggested to the Kazaks that they retreat to

[233 cont.]

[648 663 661] the southern region of that river for their own safety. At the same time the border commanders were directed not to permit its crossing from either side, and guards were reinforced for this end.

[727 728] The bloodshed diminished, but the hatred between the two peoples has continued to this day. Mutual reprisals from time to time have helped to maintain it.

[661] These results could cause the Russian government to be accused of cruelty. But let us examine the circumstances: if one takes a glance at the geographical position of the military line and the region of Orenburg, one can see what sorts of people occupy it and its outlying areas. On the other hand, if one notes the small number of troops covering the Russian border, it will be granted that the measure taken by Nepluev was the only one which could save the region he governed, and perhaps most of the southeast part of Russia. The Kazaks who lived beyond the military line would not have been the only supporters of the Bashkirs. They could have joined the Tatars of Kazan, Orenburg, Simbirsk, and Penza, who lived in the interior of the empire, and even the Teptiars and Meshcheriaks, who because of the wise measures of the [234] Orenburg authorities served to punish the rebels instead [771] of revolting. All these peoples profess the same religion, and with all of them recognizing Mohammed and seeing the Christians only as infidels (kashfyr /sic/), what could one expect from their joining together?

If these matters are considered impartially, one sees that Russia had to decide to sacrifice either the Bashkirs or the Russians. If she sacrificed the former in order to save the latter, this conduct cannot be deserving of any blame.

[661] Khan Nurali as well as his two brothers, Erali and Aichuvak, did much to help the Orenburg authorities find the Bashkirs who had fled beyond the Ural River and to bring them back to the borders. In order to please Russia they not only fought the deserters, but also those Kazaks who defended them. Although this zeal was not entirely disinterested, still, since it was accompanied by other signs of being favorably disposed, the

[234 cont.]

X 648 government took notice of it and gave orders, by way of reward (1),

1. By an ukase of August 25, 1755, the Khan was given a letter patent on this subject.

to begin to give Nurali the stipend which he had been assigned five years before and which had been withheld because he had not delivered the Russian prisoners. Later, as a favor, he was also granted permission to send kinsmen or the most distinguished of the sultans or elders to the court every two or three years. [431 661] These trips entailed, on the one hand, advantages and gifts to the Khan and his deputies, and on the other hand, they were useful to the government. During their stay at court, the envoys could serve as hostages, and as they became acquainted with the laws, customs, and habits of Russia during this sojourn, it was possible that they might become accustomed to it and spread information within the horde about the Europeans.

[721 726] The hatred and mutual hostility between the Bashkirs and the Kazaks saved many Russians from certain destruction by preventing their alliance. However this did not assure [235] peace on the border. The Bashkirs were burning with a desire for vengeance, and in spite of being forbidden to cross the Ural, they never ceased to raid the pastures of their enemies and to ruin them. Likewise the Kazaks never stopped pursuing and punishing these fiery enemies to the very center of their land. Once they had entered this region across the border, they fought the guards and pillaged the Russian settlements on their return, and these events were frequent. Although the Khan and sultans had good Y 648 intentions, they could not calm their subjects. They frankly 578 admitted their lack of power and wrote that the common people even suspected them of maintaining secret liaisons with the Orenburg authorities in order to subject all the hordes to Russia (1).

1. Sultan Aichuvak in his zeal for Russia wrote to Nepluev as early as 1754 that the ordinary Kazaks suspected him and the

[236 cont.]
×648 that its probability be considered and also the basis for it. From
662 information received about the Little Horde from an officer (1)
721

1. See Prince Urakov's reports of 1757 in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

who was sent there for the purpose, it was found out that the Kazaks had had no thought of the Kuban, but that Dunduk Dashi and two other Kalmuk princes had themselves sent confidential agents to Khan Nurali to warn him that the Crimean Tatars intended to attack Russia and to invite him to give them help, as the Kalmuks had themselves decided to do. Nurali had not rejected this proposal, but he had asked that he be warned of the moment when the Tatars would carry out their plan.

×648 This duplicity on the part of Dunduk Dashi and his Kalmuk
● 661 subjects' eternal hatred of the Kazaks caused the presumption
662 that his real aim was to decide Nurali to march against the Russians and to profit by the absence of a large part of the Little Horde to attack its defenseless auls.

However this is only a presumption, and events did not prove that it was true. For neither the Crimean Tatars nor the Kazaks attacked Russia in 1757, and consequently the Volga Kalmuks had no occasion to help the first nor to destroy the second.

×648 [237] The behavior of the Middle Horde in 1758 disturbed the Russian government more than the rumors of Nurali's alliance with the Crimean khan. Part of this horde had invaded the
[727] borders and taken the liberty of carrying off 220 Tatars of the Kuznetsk district as prisoners, people known by the name of Dvoedantsy (this name means "those who pay double tribute, or two tributes"). The Russians and the Dzungars levied tribute on these people at the same time. Another part of the Middle Horde, and this was the largest part, having seized the lands of the Dzungars who had been driven from their country, were coming closer to China and seemed too devoted to that empire.

[237 cont.]

×648 Their chief, Sultan Ablai, had sworn an oath of fealty to Russia, but later he had been under the protection of the kungtaidji of the Dzungars, Galdan Tsyren, and finally, as we said, he received a patent as a Chinese prince from the Chinese emperor. Thus the assurances of submission which he repeated to the Russian government from time to time were meaningless, and it would have been even more unwise to rely on them since his relations with China were quite frequent.

In 1756 he received a Chinese ambassador for the first time. In 1757 another officer of the Emperor came to seek to convince the entire Middle Horde to solemnly acknowledge itself as subject to China.

●[661 662] Ablai refused to carry out this request, not out of respect for the oath he had sworn to Russia but because he found this double position highly advantageous. First of all, it assured him greater independence and consideration from the two empires, and secondly, he was afraid to renounce his obedience to Russia completely because a large number of his subjects were nomadizing near the Russian borders in very favorable regions.

Russia, however, could not be satisfied with this apparent submission. In addition to the Kazak raids, she was then afraid of attacks from a much more [238] powerful enemy. For the Chinese army, which had ravaged Dzungaria had crossed the Siberian border and was threatening to enter the interior of the empire.

This fear was soon dispelled because the Chinese promptly retired into their own country, but the re-establishment of peace could not seem secure between the two empires as long as the differences remained unsettled concerning the surrender of the Dzungarian prince, Amursan, who had first acknowledged himself a vassal of China and later had sought asylum in Russia. His death ended the disagreement, but before it occurred and quiet was restored, the Orenburg authorities had opened relations with the Kazak princes of the Middle and the Little Hordes, by order of the government, [on the subject of] giving aid to Russian troops against China and of attacking the western territories of that state.

[238 cont.]

*648 On this matter Khan Nurali was presented /sic/ on March 19, 1758 with a letter patent in the name of the Empress inviting him to act in unity with the Russian troops, because the Chinese had violated the peace and invaded the Siberian border. It is not known why this letter patent was not sent. It is still preserved at Orenburg. It can be seen, however, by the business of that year that Nurali announced to the Russian officer who was sent to him expressly with gifts and orders to induce him orally to second [721] Russia that he consented to wage war against the Chinese and that he would hold himself in readiness to march.

Another officer announced, on his return from the Middle Horde, that Sultan Ablai had also promised to fight for the Russians against the Chinese. To corroborate his promises, Ablai sent two deputies who asserted that he had never acknowledged himself a subject of China but had always remained faithful to Russia and that he had relations with the Chinese and had expressed submission to them only out of fear. Although it was clear that these assurances [663] were false, the authorities intentionally pretended to be persuaded of [239] their sincerity (1), and Ablai not only received praise

1. During this same period, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote in one of its papers to the Russian Senate that Sultan Ablai had solemnly acknowledged himself a subject of China.

for his steadfast loyalty to Russia, but received a costly saber as [731] a reward, in the name of the Empress, and he was made to hope for other favors later.

[661] Khan Nurali also received several marks of good will from the Russian government because of his intention to fight the Chinese (2). Thus, when his son who was held hostage in Orenburg

2. Nurali even showed a desire to help the Russians in the war against Persia, although he had no means of carrying out his plan.

[239 cont.]
died, he was obliged to send another at once to take his place, but he delayed and thought of weak excuses, and finally the local authority received an order not to force him. It was also ordered that sheds and enclosures be built near the Ural River for him and his brothers, at the expense of the crown, for the winterings of their animals. Finally the Khan and the most distinguished sultans received many gifts at this time.

In order to calm all the Kazaks in the north and to protect them from attacks which could have stopped them even during their preparations to march against the Chinese, the strictest prohibitions were repeated to prevent the Bashkirs from crossing the Ural River.

Certain difficulties which arose in building the livestock enclosures for the Khan and the sultans, their constant requests that they be allowed to spend the winter in the steppes of Astrakhan, and the fear that this concession might bring about the destruction of the Volga Kalmuks, led the government to return, in 1759, to the idea of building a city at the mouth of the Emba. It was thought that even if the Khan and the Kazaks could not be persuaded to live there permanently, at least they would not refuse to spend the winter there in order to care for their studs and livestock. However this plan has remained [240] unrealized to this day, like the one of which we spoke above.

After Amursan's death and the cessation of the unpleasant relations which had taken place concerning him between the Russian and Chinese governments, Russia's preparations to repel an attack by the latter, as well as the aid promised by Khan Nurali and Sultan Ablai, became unnecessary. Nevertheless the Russian court continued to fear for a long time that the Kazaks might withdraw across the borders into the ravaged lands of Dzungaria. Because of Ablai's ties with China and the efforts of the Chinese to draw him into their vicinity, the Middle Horde even seemed disposed to change its place of habitation. It was supposed that if it withdrew eastward, the Little Horde would also follow its example.

Such an emigration could not harm Russia with regard to her security, for the Kazaks, after becoming her subjects, had

[242 cont.]

[648] These moods were constantly increasing the audacity of the Little Horde, and the Khan pleaded as an answer the weakness [579 685] of his power. In this situation an order was sent from St. Petersburg (1) to require the Kalmuks to return the horses they had stolen

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of July 18, 1760.

and to punish the raids of the Kazaks by sending troops into their lands to find the offenders and to seize their possessions, or at least to arrest their kinsmen. But this was to be done without touching, under any circumstances, those who were strangers to them.

[721] In 1761 part of the Little Horde attacked the Russian borders again and was again punished by force of arms. The reason for its attacks was the same as that for the year before. The Kalmuks had not returned the stolen horses, and the courtesies which were owed them had not been shown to the Khan and his brothers in Orenburg, although at the beginning of the year they had not taken part in the raids. In the autumn the Sultans Erali and Aichuvak were [579] in such a state of outrage at the behavior toward them [243] that they began to halt the caravans which were returning to Orenburg. Aichuvak even had the intention of withdrawing with the [167] Semirod descent line toward the Chinese border into the lands which had belonged to the Dzungars. In order to keep these two [661] sultans as well disposed toward Russia as they had been earlier, the higher authorities granted annual stipends to each of them in spite of the conduct of the local authorities in Orenburg.

[648] Because of this state of affairs in the Little Horde and the ambiguous position held by Sultan Ablai, which nevertheless was not harmful to Russia, when Emperor Peter III was elevated to the throne, the Khan and the principal Kazak sultans were sent [662] letters with this information without demanding a new oath from them. It was believed that they would have refused, and it was decided not to carry out this formality until they should be in Orenburg themselves. In order to keep them in a state of

[245 cont.]

×648 721 During the correspondence and the sending of couriers, the zealous Moslems joined their defenders from all sides, and by letters and sermons they incited everyone to come to their aid. Abul Mahmet, who was regarded as the khan of the Middle Horde, also received a letter of invitation, but since he had ceased to rule the Kazaks long before, he transmitted the invitation to [662] Ablai (1). The latter would no doubt have entered the general

1. The Bashkir, Tergulov, who was sent to the Middle Horde, brought a copy of this letter to Orenburg in the same year of 1763.

league of the Moslems if he had been a little less closely linked to the Chinese. But the court of Peking, in order to forestall his inclinations to help his coreligionists, had sent to Ablai shortly before the arrival of Abul Mahmet's letter a letter patent (2)

2. See the reports of the interpreter Gordeev.

which permitted him to occupy the environs of the Ili River and assured him constant protection. But at the same time [246] the [661] court of Peking took as hostage his father-in-law, Sultan Sultanamet, several elders and their children.

[662] It was also proposed to Nurali that he join the Afghans, and he did not categorically refuse. But the position of his horde and the circumstances did not permit him to march with an army toward the Chinese borders. The Kalmuks on one side and the Bashkirs on the other would not have failed to profit by the absence of the Kazaks and would not only have pillaged all their riches but also have carried off their wives and children into slavery. Nurali had reason to fear this, for the Bashkirs retained a vivid memory of the injuries they had suffered in 1755 from the Little Horde, many of which had not yet been avenged. And in 1762 the Kalmuks had suffered another blow from the Kazaks, who had reached the Volga by crossing the Caspian Sea over the ice.

[247 cont.]

The weakness of their power and their frequent dissensions are still almost unsurmountable obstacles to the security of trade, and even to this day they make it impossible to make the caravan routes used by the merchants of Tashkent, Kokand, or their eastern neighbors perfectly safe. As for communications with the Bukharans and the Khivans, Russia has another route, that of the Caspian Sea. Before the hordes acknowledged themselves vassals of the empire, it was the only route which served Russia for its trade with Persia and Central Asia. Catherine was not slow to turn her attention to this matter, and having rejected useless hopes from the promises of the Kazak princes, which were both empty and pompous, she wished [248] to concentrate all the commercial relations of her subjects with Khiva and the dominion of Bukhara in Astrakhan. But this plan was not carried out, on the one hand because the Asiatics did not find it advantageous for them, and on the other hand because it threatened Orenburg, Troitsk, and all the copper and iron mines established in their environs with complete ruin.

Nevertheless the intentions of the Russian government with regard to trade with Central Asia did not prevent it from supporting the exchange of goods with the Kazaks in every way possible. At first this was only done at Orenburg, while later it was begun at Troitsk and, in 1764, at the fort of Semipalatinsk. This last fort was designated for this purpose on the entreaty of Sultan Abulfenz, son of the famous khan, Abul Mahmet, and brother of Polat, khan of Turkestan. In the Middle Horde he was in command of the powerful Naiman descent group. He was independent, but camped in the former lands of the Dzungars, which had made him seek the protection of the emperor of China. Having never sworn loyalty to Russia nor had relations with her, he was able, without deception, to send a respectable elder to the authorities of the Siberian border to plead that his subjects have the liberty of trading with the Russians in Semipalatinsk. And this was immediately granted to him.

At this time Sultan Ablai requested the Russian government to send him ten tillers of the soil to teach his Kazaks agriculture. Catherine gave orders to satisfy his request, after having taken

[248 cont.]
x 648 secure hostages from Ablai to guarantee the freedom of the
● [661] Russians sent to him.

x 648 662 Khan Nurali, who was proud of his relations with the army of the Afghans and with China, wrote directly to the Empress in 1764, both to inform her of the invitation sent him by all the Moslems of Central Asia to take part in the war against China and also to acquaint her with the distinguished reception his embassy had had in Peking. These two circumstances inflated his vanity, and in his dreams of [249] his importance, he thought he could exact several concessions which he had already been refused. However, these repeated demands had no more success than they had had the first time. He was sent thanks from Russia for the news he had provided about the Afghans, and several gifts were added with a reply which was as polite as it was lacking in satisfaction. His horde did not remain calm, however, but con-
[721] tinued its raids against the Volga Kalmuks as much as against the Russian settlements on the border, nor did they renounce their usual dissensions, which are not worth a detailed description. Thus passed the years 1765 and 1766. In 1767 Russian troops punished them in a clear manner, by pursuing the brigands to the very middle of the horde.

x 648 662 643 There is no doubt that this chastisement made Nurali violently angry. Since he needed Catherine's good graces, however, he hid his resentment for a long time. He was afraid that after his death the position of khan might pass to another family, and asked that a successor or deputy be designated while he still lived and that the Russian government ceremonially elevate his eldest son, Ishim, to this new post. This was a new desire, but it was not in opposition to Russian views. It was true that Russia could designate one of Nurali's brothers as khan of the Little Horde if she chose. But since there was no reason then for preferring them above other sultans and since the Empress Anna, when she promised Abulkhair to preserve the post of khan for posterity, did not fix any rule for the choice of his successors, Nurali's wish could be fulfilled. Also the particular qualities of Sultan Ishim were no obstacle to the accomplishment of his

K [250 cont.]
x 648 Horde, and with greater success, and finally the vexation of his
[152 [251] own weakness, all troubled him and removed his power to
578] act with coolness. Having aroused his arrogance, the court of
K Petersburg rejected the thought it had had of increasing his power
[66] over the Kazaks, a measure which had once been thought indis-
pensable. Thus Nurali came to the point where he began to be
given less consideration. In spite of his brothers' quarrels with
him, they were sent sabers as a reward for their zeal, and his
request for stipends fixed by the year were put aside. He was
even refused permission to send deputies to Petersburg. It was
directed to pay no attention to his obstinacy on the matter of the
hostage and to say to him always that Russia would know how to
maintain the Kazaks in obedience without that (1). The same

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 16, 1770.

thing was written that year to Sultan Ablai, who, in the hopes
of receiving several advantages and privileges from Russia,
offered to give up one of his sons as hostage, but later, after he
saw that most of his demands could not be satisfied, he refused
on fantastic pretexts to carry out what he himself had proposed.
K The renewal of the raids on the Orenburg border by the
[721] Little Horde in 1770 was about to bring still another punishment (2)

2. Reinsdorf, the governor of Orenburg, received on January 10, 1771 an order from the Empress to send troops into the Kazak steppe in order to punish the bandits and free the prisoners.

x K
648
167 upon them by the Russian government, which they were fortunate
EK enough to avoid only because of the desertion of the Volga Kalmuks,
KO which gave affairs a new turn. This change gave a new destina-
648 tion to the Russian troops, who had been enemies of the Kazaks
167 and now became their allies. We will now give the history of

[259 cont.]
×648 of the punishment inflicted upon it by the Russian troops the year
[727] before. The Middle Horde had been causing suspicion for some time because the rumor had spread that Ablai, profiting from the recent troubles of the Bashkirs, had sent several messengers to them to induce them to move under his domination. But investigations proved that these rumors were false.

During the months of June and October of this same year, several elders and sultans who were independent of Ablai sent deputies to the commander of the Siberian line to propose that
[661] they be recognized as Russian subjects. Among these was the son of Khan Abul Mahmet, Abulfeis, who had asked that he be assigned an annual stipend. Ablai's son and nephew asked for the same thing.

Empress Catherine received the report and replied in a rescript of May 25, 1776 in the name of the governor of Orenburg, as the principal administrator of Kazak matters, that the individual proposals made by the Kazaks of the Middle Horde to be received as subjects were founded on nothing more than the desire to obtain gifts. It was added that they were completely useless, for the entire horde had been recognized as subjects of the empire since the reign of Empress Anna, and that if such demands were satisfied this would only produce new demands. Furtheremore it was said that the fixing of annual stipends would become an obligation for the government and would accustom the Kazaks to regard as a duty that which was only the effect of the government's indulgence, and consequently it would be much better to conciliate them with gifts which were not fixed. These concepts showed a profound knowledge of the character of the Kazaks; they were the fruit of 46 years experience, from 1730 to 1776.

×648 Irnazar Maksiutov, the Bukharan ambassador, who came to
439 [260] Russia in 1775, revived the idea of building a Russian city in the Kazak steppe at the mouth of the Emba in the conferences he had on the means of removing the trade of caravans between Russia and Bukhara from all danger. The Russian government showed itself ready to carry out the plan (1), but it remained without

1. As a result of the ukase given on this

[261]

x648 643 The Russian government asked him by what right he had taken this title, and he boldly replied that he had acquired it by his victories over the Torguts and, after the death of Abul Mahmet, not only by the choice of the Kazak hordes but also by that of the residents of Turkestan and Tashkent. He added that following the example of his independent ancestors and the khans who were his predecessors, he wished to live in Turkestan near the tomb of Khodja Akhmet (1). It was then too late to remind

1. The Kazaks regard Khodja Akhmet, who is buried in /the town of/ Turkestan, as the greatest saint after Mohammed.

Ablai of the obligations of a faithful subject. But it was necessary at least to sustain the idea in the hordes that no one could become khan in one of them without the consent of Russia. The Empress ordered that an officer be sent to Ablai to induce him especially to request the confirmation of his new position from the Russian government.

● [661] He consented to this proposal and promised to send his son, Sultan Tugum, to St. Petersburg.

On November 25, 1777, it was officially announced to him that the Empress had agreed to his request, if he would transmit it in writing rather than orally. It was ordered to return his son from the border to the horde in the opposite case.

Ablai made not the slightest opposition to sending a written request. Consequently, Sultan Tugum, who conveyed it to St. Petersburg, was received most graciously, and his father was confirmed as khan by a certificate on October 22, 1778.

This certificate was sent to Orenburg, accompanied by a robe of honor, a saber, and a hat, and Ablai was invited to present himself to receive them and to swear the oath in Orenburg, Troitsk, or on the Siberian line. But when he refused to come, the Russian government consented to his taking the oath in the horde in the presence of a Russian officer, who would then

[275 cont.]
x 648 Baron Igelstrom not only forgot Batyr Syrym's former actions but even took him under his special protection, chose him as the instrument of his operations, maintained a correspondence with him at once, and held conferences with him, as though he were the chargé d'affaires or the representative of the entire national [662 152] assembly. When the Khan was informed of these details, he wrote that Syrym was a knave who was deceiving the government and that he had no thought of re-establishing good order but only considered his own interests. The Khan also said that he attributed his own opinions to the entire assembly and that in his heart he was a sworn enemy of Russia, etc. These accusations were vindicated by time, but coming from the lips of a weak and humiliated sovereign and under circumstances which explicitly belied his accusations, they could not appear true and were accordingly allowed to slip into oblivion. It is true that Nurali added certain unequivocal signs of his devotion to Russia, for at this time he [728] released several Russian prisoners whom he had brought to the horde, offered his children as hostages, and placed himself at the disposal of the government. But he was too late. His personal submission was no longer needed. What was wanted was the force of power or of genius, which alone was capable of acting upon the horde.

x 648 Syrym had already acquired this force by his intelligence, 643 his influence over the people, and by the protection of the border 661 authorities. Thus it appeared that he promised greater advantages than the Khan, who had shown nothing but weakness for 37 years. The fate of this unhappy prince deserves pity. Yet following the opinion he had formed of Nurali and the system which had been adopted, Baron Igelstrom no longer found it possible to keep him in the horde. Thus he asked permission to [276] have the Khan brought into Russia, and once he had been received (1),

1. By a rescript of the Empress of June 3, 1786.

[276 cont.]
he was no less quick to profit from it, as he was soon presented with an opportunity to do.

Syrym's followers, as much to please him as to satisfy their own greediness, did not stop with committing offenses against Nurali in all sorts of ways, but ended by attacking villages and pillaging everything they found there. Nurali, defenseless, turned to the power of Russia and requested an armed guard from the border authorities. When he was refused, he decided to withdraw to Orenburg for a time in order to save his life, and from this city he was taken to Ufa, where he died four years later. His brother Aichuvak was detained during this time in Uralsk.

It is useless to describe the impression which these events gave to Nurali's children and the other descendants of Abulkhair. The eldest and the best known, because of his intelligence and valor, was Sultan Erali, who had had frequent relations with Russia, as we have seen. But six years before he had conquered the Karakalpaks and lived with them on the Syr [Darya] (2). He

2. Bekehurin, an interpreter of Orenburg, traveled on the Syr in 1781, and found Sultan Erali was already sovereign of the Karakalpaks.

knew perfectly well who was mainly responsible for the misfortunes of his brothers and who had caused them to lose the protection of Russia, which Abulkhair and his line had had for more than half a century. Anxious to avenge the grievances of his family, he resolved to attack Syrym and marched against him with an army which was few in number but could be counted upon. Luck smiled upon Sultan Erali on this expedition. He captured the representative of the national assembly, the title which Syrym gave himself.

At this same time other tribes of the Little Horde, who were not attached to Abulkhair's family but also did not wish to follow the incitements of Syrym or of his principal accomplices and who were accustomed, furthermore, to having khans,

[295 cont.]

×648 In 1793, Lieutenant General Strandman, commandant of the Siberian line, sent a body of troops into the Kazak steppes which liberated the Turkmen prisoners. Vali was so distressed at this loss that he complained to the Empress. The only satisfaction he received was the permission to come to St. Petersburg to explain all his needs and his requests, and he did not take advantage of this because he was afraid to leave the horde. Finally, after the death of his brother Chingis, he announced that all his complaints [662] had been made on the advice of his brother, and he reconciled himself with the local authorities and promised to help them in all matters.

This move, however, was not a proof of perfect devotion to Russia, for he wished to maintain his relations with China, following the example of his father, and to this end he sent his son to the emperor of China in the winter of 1794-95 to bear witness to his [643 submission. At the same time he continued to oppress the tribal 661] chiefs, except those who were attached to Russia. The result of this behavior was that in January, 1795 two sultans, 19 elders, 43,360 of their subjects and 79,000 other Kazaks submitted a petition to the Empress asking to be delivered from Vali's rule and to be accepted under the direct dominion of the Russian government.

The execution of this demand was too difficult and promised no advantage to Russia. In the meantime Vali showed signs of repentance and raised the hope that he would become reconciled with the malcontents, and therefore things remained in their original state.

[619] The part of the horde which lived along the Verkhne-Uralsk line and had the Bashkirs for neighbors, as we said above, in 1795 gave the most [296] convincing proof of the truth of our reflections about the causes which made the Middle Horde more peaceful than [639 the Little Horde. At the time when the tribes and divisions of the 727] Kazaks along the border were peacefully carrying on trade with the Russians on the Siberian line, it made several raids in the districts [727] of Chelyabinsk and Verkhne-Uralsk, laid waste several villages then, took many prisoners, and carried off quite a large number of

numbers in the Kazakh SSR (and probably in any minority republic where the non-Russian native population is less well educated than the Russians) is that "qualification for a job" implies not only technical proficiency but also political reliability. For higher-ranking positions political sophistication and active participation may actually be required in addition to professional training and experience.

Adding to these conditions Moscow's continuous demand that more and more natives be brought into the machinery ("korenizatsiia aparata"), one can see the predicament of the Kazakh bosses. In the past it has often happened that the only candidates qualified in terms of training and political reliability were relatives of those already in administrative positions. The accusation of nepotism is, therefore, fairly frequent. This and other complaints in connection with the cadre system are voiced in some detail in a Central Committee decree of March 1947, "On the selection, training, and placement of Party and Soviet cadres by Kazakh Communist Party organization." The most pertinent clause of this decree, repeated recently in Kazakhstanskaia Pravda (21 September 1952), reads: ". . . selection of cadres [of Party workers] on a basis of friendship, personal devotion, family ties and kinship is incompatible with membership in the Party."[1] The social basis of nepotism in Central Asia has been discussed previously, in regard to family relations.

At present the men in charge in Kazakhstan seem to be counting on an increase in the general level of education to solve this knotty problem. The importance of the economic problem for the Kazakh Party is shown by the fact that its two most powerful first secretaries lost their jobs over manpower and production failures. The energetic Goloshchekin was replaced when too-rapid and brutal collectivization procedures resulted in social and economic disaster. More recently Shaiakhmetov, probably the most skillful politician to dominate Soviet Kazakhstan, was demoted (together with other responsible officials) when agricultural production failed—by a wide margin—to reach the planned level.

It is perhaps surprising that Shaiakhmetov managed to remain in power as long as he did (seven years). Since the end of World War II, Moscow had been applying pressure for better exploitation of Kazakhstan's potential in animal husbandry and grain production. Warnings by the Central Party organs (including Pravda) were numerous and explicit. The historical details are not important here except insofar as they support the argument that the 1954 demise of several Kazakh leaders was primarily an economic rather than a political purge. This interpretation was reinforced recently by the report that Comrade Shaiakhmetov had been "re-elected" by Alma-Ata voters.

The problem of production efficiency and adequately trained manpower arises in industry as well as in agriculture, although less frequently and less violently. It may be that factories and mines by their

[1] The most dramatic case was that of Nurvaev, former KSSR minister of justice, who was expelled from the Party by the Central Committee of the All-Union Party for "corruption." At that time, other functionaries were ousted with him for "deception of Party organs and unworthy conduct in respect to cadre affairs."